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BLD-241

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-1471
___________
AURELIO VALVERDE,
AKA Aurelio Santiago Valverde,
Petitioner
v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A042-978-294)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Ramin Rastegar
____________________________________
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 14, 2018
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 20, 2018)
___________
OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Petitioner Aurelio Valverde petitions for review of a final order of removal. The
Government has filed a motion for summary disposition. We will grant the
Government’s motion and deny the petition for review.
Valverde is a citizen of Peru. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful
permanent resident in 1991. Between 2006 and 2013, Valverde was convicted of
receiving stolen property, driving with a suspended license, driving while intoxicated,
burglary, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, all in violation of New Jersey law. In
2014, the Department of Homeland Security charged Valverde with being removable as
an alien who had been convicted of a crime of violence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Valverde’s removal, and
Valverde appealed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded and ordered the
IJ to reconsider the matter in light of this Court’s ruling in Baptiste v. Attorney General,
841 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 2016), that part of the federal statute defining “crime of
violence” is unconstitutionally vague.
On remand, the Government lodged a new charge of removability, alleging that
Valverde was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude (conspiracy to commit kidnapping and receiving stolen property). See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Counsel for Valverde argued that the Government was not permitted
to assert a new charge of removal on remand; the IJ rejected that argument. Counsel then
conceded that Valverde had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, see
A.R. at 117-19, but applied for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied the cancellation
application, concluding that while Valverde was statutorily eligible, he did not warrant
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relief as a matter of discretion. Valverde appealed to the BIA, raising two arguments—
that the Government should not have been allowed to lodge the new removal charge and
that the IJ should have granted cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed.
Valverde filed a petition for review to this Court. He also filed a motion for a stay
of removal, which we denied. After Valverde filed his initial brief, the Government filed
a motion to dismiss the petition or for summary disposition. Valverde then filed a second
motion to stay.
We generally have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). However, because Valverde conceded removability for having committed
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdiction-stripping
provision applies. See generally Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246-47 (3d Cir.
2006). As a result, our jurisdiction is limited to questions of law and constitutional
claims. See § 1252(a)(2)(D). 1
In his brief, Valverde raises just a single claim: that principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel barred the Government from filing a new charge of removal after the
case had been remanded by the BIA. He is incorrect. The Government may file new
charges of removal “[a]t any time,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30—
including after remand, see Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir.
2006) (rejecting judicial-estoppel challenge to post-remand amendment); Valencia-
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In his brief, Valverde does not challenge the agency’s denial of his request for
cancellation of removal. In any event, we note that we also lack jurisdiction to review the
discretionary denial of cancellation of removal. See § 1252(a)(2)(B); Pareja v. Att’y
Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).
3

Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting res-judicata
challenge).
Having considered the Government’s motion for summary disposition and to
dismiss, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily deny the petition for
review. We also deny Valverde’s motion for a stay of removal.
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